Pink, White and Blue:  Class Assumptions in the Judicial Interpretations of Title VII Hostile Environment Sex Harassment by Lee, Rebecca K.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 3 Article 1
2005
Pink, White and Blue: Class Assumptions in the
Judicial Interpretations of Title VII Hostile
Environment Sex Harassment
Rebecca K. Lee
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Rebecca K. Lee, Pink, White and Blue: Class Assumptions in the Judicial Interpretations of Title VII Hostile Environment Sex Harassment,
70 Brook. L. Rev. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol70/iss3/1
 2/28/2005 12:02:54 PM 
ARTICLES 
Pink, White, and Blue 
CLASS ASSUMPTIONS IN THE JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII HOSTILE 
ENVIRONMENT SEX HARASSMENT* 
Rebecca K. Lee† 
I.   INTRODUCTION..................................................................... 678 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE 
  ON HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEX HARASSMENT.................680 
III. IMPACT OF SEX HARASSMENT LAW ON THE WORKPLACE.. 688 
A. Faragher and Ellerth: Impact on Employers .............. 688 
B. Federal Government Survey: Impact on Employees ... 691 
IV. THE CLASS DEBATE: BLUE-COLLAR V. WHITE-COLLAR? ... 693 
A. Special Treatment of Class Context............................. 694 
B. Non-Special Treatment of Class Context..................... 696 
V.  DEBUNKING THE ASSUMPTIONS.......................................... 699 
A. Judicial Depictions of Blue-Collar Norms .................. 699 
B. Vulgarity Along the Workplace Spectrum ................... 701 
C. Sex Harassment and the Cultural Defense Argument ..….704 
VI. REFRAMING THE DISCUSSION: MASCULINE, NOT  
 CLASS, WORKPLACE NORMS.............................................. 709 
A. Sex Harassment As Male Normative Behavior ........... 710 
B. Question of Essentialism.............................................. 715 
C. Progress (to be made) in the Workplace....................... 716 
D. Assumption of Risk Defense......................................... 718 
VII. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 724 
  
 * © Rebecca K. Lee 2005. All Rights Reserved. 
 † Associate, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C. J.D., Georgetown 
University Law Center, 2004; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, 2001; A.B., University of Chicago, 1997. I would like to extend my deep 
thanks to Vicki Jackson, Elizabeth Patterson, Diane Rosenfeld, Robin West, and 
Wendy Williams for their insights, encouragement, and inspiration. 
677 
 2/28/2005 12:02:54 PM 
678 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court main-
stay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female 
workers of America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII 
was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social 
mores of American workers.1 
Hostile environment sex harassment2 jurisprudence has 
gone astray. Rather than make good on Title VII’s3 promise to 
dismantle the legacy of sex discrimination in the workplace, 
some courts, such as the Tenth Circuit quoted above, have 
decided that sex harassment law simply cannot be expected to 
affect the way in which men and women interact at work. This 
passive view of Title VII has manifested itself in court rulings 
that suggest that harassment law cannot pierce the cultural 
exterior of the blue-collar workplace, where crude and offensive 
behavior is allowed to reign.4  Factoring in the class culture of 
the workplace—that is, the blue- or white-collar culture of the 
workplace—when assessing hostile work environment claims 
has essentially established a different standard for what 
constitutes harassment of blue-collar women, forcing them to 
prove harassing behavior above and beyond what is “normal” 
for the blue-collar work setting. Courts that reject this trend 
recognize that considering workplace culture in this way 
creates unequal tiers of protection from sex harassment under 
Title VII,5 making it more difficult for women in blue-collar 
fields to seek legal redress for a hostile work environment. 
Accordingly, these courts have declined to take into account 
class culture in order to provide uniform protection for all 
working women. The result has been a bifurcation of court 
  
 1 Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d, 805 F.2d 
611 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 2 I use the term “sex harassment” instead of “sexual harassment” 
throughout this article to emphasize that harassment is a form of sex discrimination 
under the law, whether or not it is rooted in sexual want. See Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-80 (1998) (referring to Title VII’s proscription of 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” and holding that harassment “need not be 
motivated by sexual desire”). See also discussion infra Part VI. 
 3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against “any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). This federal statute 
proscribes workplace sex harassment as a form of sex discrimination in employment. 
 4 See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 5 See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
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rulings that leaves women working in the blue-collar trades 
vulnerable to a particular court’s take on the role of workplace 
culture.   
The recent judicial trend recognizing a blue-collar 
setting as different from a white-collar setting is disturbing 
because focusing on class differences within the work 
environment misunderstands and obscures the true purpose of 
sex harassment law under Title VII: to make the work 
environment more accommodating for women by removing the 
discrimination and harassment that have long disadvantaged 
them as workers. The vestiges of sex discrimination and gender 
animus in the workplace6 are culturally-based,7 not class-based, 
and thus must be countered with a cultural re-understanding 
of appropriate workplace behavior. Contrary to the Tenth 
Circuit’s inert view of Title VII, sex harassment law has had an 
impact in the workplace. It is not magic. But it is law, the effect 
of which has led to increased awareness on the part of 
employees, clearer company policies, and the development of 
on-site training.8 
The current debate over blue-collar versus white-collar 
culture diverts attention away from the central goal of sex 
harassment law and proceeds along a deleterious detour. One 
only need observe the crude and “rough hewn” behavior that 
permeates both types of workplaces to see that no real 
difference exists between blue-collar and white-collar 
environments with respect to sex harassment.9 Vulgar actions10 
pervade both the shop-room and the boardroom because the 
public world of work, whether blue- or white-collar, has long 
been a male-dominated realm shaped by masculine norms.11 
Although the migration of women into the workforce has 
changed the sex balance to varying degrees in different fields, 
women still confront hostile attitudes at work. The problem of 
sex harassment speaks to unwelcome male reactions to women 
  
 6 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).  
 7 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 8 See discussion infra Part III. 
 9 See discussion infra Part V.B.  
 10 I use the terms “vulgar” and “crude” behavior to refer to hostile conduct in 
the workplace that is discriminatory on the basis of gender—behavior that falls under 
actionable sex harassment under Title VII. These terms are not intended to encompass 
nondiscriminatory language. 
 11 See discussion infra Part VI.  
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entering the work environment, and not just a type of work 
environment.12  
This article suggests that cultural patterns of gender 
rather than class have defined the work environment, 
overriding any supposed class distinctions with respect to sex 
harassment. Title VII, to be effective, must oppose and help 
reshape the gendered culture of the workplace rather than 
excuse it under a false cloak of class normative justification. 
This article traces the Supreme Court’s Title VII jurisprudence 
on hostile environment sex harassment in Part II, and follows 
with a discussion of the impact of harassment law on the 
workplace in Part III. Part IV delves into the current 
controversy between blue-collar and white-collar culture, while 
Part V discredits the behavioral assumptions associated with 
class. Finally, Part VI reframes the dialogue by reconnecting 
the phenomenon of sex harassment to masculine behavioral 
norms in the work setting. When examining sex harassment 
hostile environment claims, courts need to remain faithful to 
what sex harassment law aims to address and ameliorate: the 
problem of sex discrimination in the form of gendered and 
sexualized workplace culture. Eliminating the false divide 
between blue-collar and white-collar environments will 
advance a more productive understanding of sex harassment 
law and better address the traditional barriers to working 
women.  
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE ON 
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEX HARASSMENT 
Sex harassment was first judicially recognized as 
impermissible sex discrimination within the meaning of Title 
VII in 1986, when the Supreme Court decided Meritor Savings 
  
 12 While this article focuses on sex harassment in the workplace, I want to 
note that sex harassment is a common problem that occurs in other environments as 
well, including on the street, at school, and through the Internet. See generally Anita L. 
Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2000) (stating that 
sex harassment and other behavior that reduce women’s privacy also permeate 
cyberspace); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal 
Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993) (arguing that street harassment 
significantly restricts women’s freedom and confines them to the home); Rebecca K. 
Lee, Romantic and Electronic Stalking in a College Context, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 373 (1998) (describing how women are stalked and harassed via e-mail and other 
on-line forums); Pamela Y. Price, Eradicating Sexual Harassment in Education, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 60 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2004) (discussing the ineffectiveness of Title IX in addressing the 
continuing problem of sex harassment in educational settings).  
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Bank v. Vinson.13 In Meritor, the plaintiff Mechelle Vinson 
alleged that her male superior, a vice president at the bank 
where she worked, propositioned her for a sexual relationship.14 
Although Vinson first objected, she eventually relented because 
she thought that she would be fired if she did not.15 From this 
point on, and continuing over the course of several years, 
Vinson testified that her supervisor repeatedly subjected her to 
sexual advances at the bank, describing how he “fondled her in 
front of other employees, followed her into the women’s 
restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, 
and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.”16 After four 
years at the bank, Vinson left on an indefinite sick leave and 
was then fired for her extended absence.17 Vinson sued the 
supervisor and the bank for sex harassment under Title VII, 
but the federal district court rejected her claim, failing even to 
settle the contradictory testimony regarding whether Vinson 
and the supervisor had engaged in sexual relations.18 Instead, 
the district court found that even if a sexual relationship did 
exist, it was voluntary and did not implicate Vinson’s 
employment.19 The appellate court reversed, finding that the 
district court had not considered whether Vinson’s allegation 
constituted a hostile work environment, which would be 
actionable under Title VII.20 
The Supreme Court held in Meritor that sex harassment 
is a form of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, 
actionable in either its quid pro quo or hostile environment 
form.21 An employer is liable for quid pro quo harassment when 
sexual relations are implicitly or explicitly tied to economic or 
employment consequences.22 Hostile environment harassment 
involves workplace conduct that unreasonably interferes with 
an individual’s work performance or renders the work 
  
 13 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 14 Id. at 59-60. 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id. at 60. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 60-61. Vinson’s supervisor denied all 
allegations of sexual relations, arguing that she had brought her claim as a result of a 
business dispute. Id. at 61. 
 19 Id. at 61. 
 20 Id. at 62. 
 21 Id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)). While the Court 
remanded the case on the issue of hostile environment sex harassment, the Court 
declined to announce a rule with respect to employer liability. Id. at 72-73. 
 22 Id. at 64-65.  
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environment intimidating, hostile, or offensive.23 In discussing 
the applicability of the hostile environment theory to sex 
harassment, the Court looked to lower court case law involving 
racial and ethnic discrimination. The Court highlighted Rogers 
v. EEOC,24 a Fifth Circuit case holding an employer liable 
under Title VII for creating a hostile environment for a 
minority employee by discriminating against its also minority 
clientele, even though the complainant did not sustain 
economic injury.25 Following Rogers, the Supreme Court 
observed that other courts applied the hostile environment 
theory to cases involving harassment based on race,26 religion,27 
and national origin.28 The Supreme Court agreed that Title VII 
also could be used to proscribe hostile environment harassment 
based on sex,29 in accordance with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s [EEOC] promulgated Guidelines on 
sex harassment.30 The comparison to race harassment is a 
logical one, and the Court highlighted this analogy, quoting the 
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Henson v. City of Dundee: “Sexual 
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment 
for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to 
sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to 
racial equality.”31 The parallel between sex and race 
harassment under the law does not mean, however, that they 
do not intersect in real life; sex harassment of minority women 
  
 23 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-65. 
 24 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) 
 25 Id. at 65-66. 
 26 See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 
506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (cited in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 
(1986)); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (cited in 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66). 
 27 See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) 
(cited in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66). 
 28 See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (cited in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66). 
 29 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. 
 30 The Guidelines provide in pertinent part:  
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) 
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or 
condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions 
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.  
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2003).  
 31 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 
902 (11th Cir. 1982)).  
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is often tinted with race harassment, implicating and harming 
their multi-faceted identities as women and as women of color.32 
The Supreme Court in Meritor found that hostile 
environment harassment based on sex does indeed fall within 
Title VII’s purview, and added that to be actionable, the 
harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’”33 Class was not germane to evaluating this 
hostile environment claim. The Court neither remarked upon 
the class norms of Vinson’s workplace nor referred to the 
white-collar setting of the bank in determining that the 
harassment was severe and pervasive. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that the Court had noticed the white-collar nature of 
Vinson’s work environment, such an observation would have 
only helped to demonstrate that crudity does not stop short of 
the professional office: certainly no one would claim that the 
conduct in this case (i.e., fondling, exposing, forcibly raping) 
was anything less than an example of extreme and violent 
vulgarity, and the harasser nobody less than a white-collar 
executive.  
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,34 the Supreme Court 
further articulated the standards by which to assess the 
admittedly difficult hostile environment harassment suit. The 
facts in Harris show that Charles Hardy, the president of an 
equipment rental company, subjected a female manager to a 
slew of sexist and sexually-oriented comments.35 According to 
Harris’ testimony, Hardy repeatedly hurled insults at her, for 
example saying “‘[y]ou’re a woman, what do you know,’”36 
calling her “‘a dumb ass woman,’”37 and publicly suggesting that 
he and Harris “‘go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [her] raise.’”38  
When Hardy failed to change his behavior after Harris 
complained, she quit the company and filed a hostile 
environment sex harassment charge.39  
The Supreme Court upheld Harris’ claim, ruling that 
harassment creates a cause of action if it satisfies both an 
objective and subjective standard: (1) the conduct must be 
  
 32 See discussion infra Part V.C.  
 33 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).  
 34 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 35 Id. at 19. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. 
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“severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or 
abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable 
person would find hostile or abusive;”40 and (2) the complainant 
must “subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive.”41  
The Court additionally held that psychological injury to the 
employee is relevant but not necessary to show that the 
environment was abusive to the complainant. 42 Instead of 
stating dispositive factors, the Court recommended applying a 
totality of the circumstances analysis that “may include the 
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it 
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.”43  
Again, as in Meritor, the Court did not comment upon 
the class context of Harris’ work setting, nor did the Court 
include it as a factor in the totality analysis it set forth. While 
it is true that the list of factors was not meant to be exhaustive, 
one would expect the Court to have included the class context 
of the work environment if it were an especially relevant factor. 
It is not even clear how the “class factor” would be construed in 
Harris, because while the industry setting was blue-collar, the 
accused harasser was the white-collar president of the 
company. Does the industry setting where the harassment 
takes place determine the class characterization of the 
workplace, or is this established by the specific status of the 
harasser? What if the president or upper-level manager rose to 
his position from the shop-floor?44 Does it matter? The answer is 
no. Sex harassment, by definition, is discrimination based on 
sex, not class. Thus, class context is not relevant to a finding of 
sex harassment. “As the [EEOC] emphasized,” Justice 
Ginsburg observed in her concurring opinion in Harris, “the 
adjudicator’s inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether 
the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with 
the plaintiff’s work performance.”45 Accordingly, the analysis of 
  
 40 Id. at 21. 
 41 Id. at 21-22. 
 42 Id. at 23. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See SUSAN FALUDI, STIFFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN MAN 66 
(1999) (stating that in at least one naval shipyard that the author had visited, “[t]he 
white-collar administrators had largely risen from the blue-collar shops”).  
 45 Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, and adding that 
harassment which alters the working conditions “as to ‘ma[k]e it more difficult to do 
the job’” would sufficiently establish that the harassment has “unreasonably interfered 
with the plaintiff’s work performance,” citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 
 
 2/28/2005 12:02:54 PM 
2005] PINK, WHITE, AND BLUE 685 
a hostile environment claim should focus on whether the 
plaintiff found it harder to perform the job in the face of hostile 
interference, regardless of the class association of the plaintiff’s 
work environment.  
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,46 the 
most recent sex harassment case to clarify the type of behavior 
that constitutes a hostile environment, the Supreme Court held 
that hostile environment harassment not motivated by sexual 
desire can still violate Title VII if the harassment is because of 
sex. Plaintiff Joseph Oncale worked as a roustabout on an oil 
rig where other male crew members publicly forced him to 
endure sexually humiliating activity, including physical and 
sexual assaults.47 He received no help and little sympathy after 
complaining to supervisory personnel, and simply was told that 
his situation was not unique since the same crew members had 
also harassed other employees in the company.48 Oncale soon 
resigned because he feared that he would be raped by his 
harassers if he remained.49 The Supreme Court found that 
same-sex harassment is harassment based on sex,50 as required 
under Title VII, and that sex harassment need not be 
erotically-motivated but can be the product of gender animus.51 
Taking the Court’s position a step further, it follows that 
gender hostility in turn is largely culturally-derived from 
masculine norms dictating who (in terms of gender identity) 
and what (in terms of conduct) are acceptable in a particular 
  
345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).  
 46 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 47 Id. at 77.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. According to Oncale’s allegations,  
[T]he harassment included [Danny] Pippen and [Brandon] Johnson 
restraining him while [John] Lyons placed his penis on Oncale’s neck, on one 
occasion, and on Oncale’s arm, on another occasion; threats of homosexual 
rape by Lyons and Pippen; and the use of force by Lyons to push a bar of soap 
into Oncale’s anus while Pippen restrained Oncale as he was showering on 
Sundowner premises.  
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 
523 U.S. 75 (1998).  
 50 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81. 
 51 Id. at 80. As the Court put it: 
But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an 
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might 
reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is 
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to 
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the 
presence of women in the workplace.  
Id.  
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work environment.52 In this vein, the threatening and abusive 
actions committed against Oncale were disturbing attempts to 
emasculate him within the highly-masculinized environment of 
the oil rig. By standing for the proposition that a man could be 
subjected to sex harassment by fellow male co-workers absent 
any sexual motivation, Oncale serves to undercut the primacy 
of (heterosexual) masculine norms in the workplace and 
arguably establishes gay rights in the area of sex harassment 
law.53 
In trying to elucidate the objective and subjective 
standard when determining the severity of the harassment,54 
the Court stated in dicta that workplace behavior should be 
viewed in light of the “surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships”55 and that courts should be 
sensitive to the “social context” in which the alleged behavior 
takes place.56 Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion for 
the Court in Oncale, offered a comparison between the 
environment of a professional football player and that of the 
coach’s secretary:  
A professional football player’s working environment is not severely 
or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the 
buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would 
reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male 
or female) back at the office . . . . Common sense, and an appropriate 
sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to 
distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among 
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in 
the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.57 
Rather than move sex harassment law forward, 
however, Oncale’s language likely has confused it. After 
Oncale, courts will apply their own sense of how “social 
context” should be understood, and many may continue to 
follow in the backward footsteps of the Tenth Circuit quoted 
  
 52 See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
 53 See Marc Spindelman, Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 201 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (stating 
that “Oncale is an important step forward for sex equality rights, including the rights 
of lesbians and gay men,” in opposition to Janet Halley’s queer theory critique that 
Oncale allows Title VII to become a dangerous tool for sexuality regulation, including 
homophobic regulation (citing Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 183 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2004))).  
 54 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. 
 55 Id. at 82. 
 56 Id. at 81. 
 57 Id. at 81-82. 
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earlier.58 Some courts have already seized upon Oncale’s vague 
“common sense” directive to argue that workplace culture is 
part of the social context and should be taken into account 
when evaluating harassment claims.59 Although the Supreme 
Court has never specifically mentioned class, lower courts both 
before and after Oncale have defined workplace culture in 
terms of class—that is, according to its blue- or white-collar 
context.60 But it does not appear that Oncale’s text supports this 
understanding, especially given Justice Scalia’s own preference 
for close textual readings. The comparison that the Court made 
between the professional football player on the field and the 
secretary back at the office is not a comparison between a blue-
collar and white-collar workplace. Moreover, it focuses on a 
male-centered professional sport that is hardly representative 
of most work environments. To be fair, perhaps the Court 
presented the football example because both the professional 
football player and the roustabout on the oil rig work in 
predominately, if not exclusively, male environments. Even so, 
the Court did not link the analogy to a discussion of Oncale’s 
particular situation, and in any event the illustration still fails 
to make a class distinction. Arguably, if the Supreme Court 
had wanted class context to be specifically considered in the 
totality of the circumstances test, the Court could have either 
included class or used the phrase “economic context” instead of 
“social context” in its decision.  
Oncale would have provided a good opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to set forth differing standards of vulgarity 
depending on the blue- or white-collar work context, since 
Oncale itself is set within the blue-collar setting of the oil 
platform. Yet the Court opinion did not at all discuss the 
“natural” crudeness of Oncale’s work environment or hold his 
harassers’ actions to a different standard of coarseness. That 
the Court did not use the facts and setting of Oncale to 
illustrate any supposed class difference in harassing behavior 
is telling. Rather, Oncale is important because the Court 
recognized that same-sex harassment could be sex harassment, 
irrespective of the class context. In sum, the Supreme Court in 
its jurisprudence on sex harassment has focused only on the 
discriminatory dynamics of the workplace based on sex and 
  
 58 Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 59 See, e.g., Pirolli v. World Flavors, Inc., No. 98-3596, 1999 WL 1065214, at 
*5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1999); Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 60 See case discussion infra Part IV. 
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gender, and not on class.61 The Circuit courts that have 
diverged from this gender-based analysis have neglected to 
consider the entire context of these Supreme Court cases, and 
have interjected their own class assumptions in the 
adjudication of hostile environment harassment claims, in this 
way failing to uphold the fundamental goal of Title VII.  
III.  IMPACT OF SEX HARASSMENT LAW ON THE WORKPLACE 
When the Tenth Circuit echoed the district court 
sentiment that one could hardly “claim that Title VII was 
designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social 
mores of American workers,”62 it was correct only in the sense 
that the change was not meant to be “magical” but part of the 
normal course of business for employers. For women to have 
access to equal opportunity in employment, employers 
necessarily need to play an active role in addressing the 
obstacles that have kept women out of certain job sectors for 
too long. Promoting awareness of sex harassment through 
harassment law has helped create a different understanding of 
expectations in the workplace, affecting both employers and 
employees alike. 
A.  Faragher and Ellerth: Impact on Employers 
After Oncale, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of 
sex harassment, this time concerning the issue of employer 
liability. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,63 the Court held 
  
 61 While the United States was one of the first nations to render sex 
harassment illegal as a form of sex discrimination and has made the most progress in 
this area of the law, other countries around the world have also begun to take steps to 
address sex harassment. For instance, the European Community in 1991 passed a 
Code of Conduct (although not binding) with the goal of preventing sex harassment. 
Notably, this Code also does not include the class culture of the workplace in defining 
what constitutes a hostile work environment based on sex. Rather, the Code states in 
relevant part that “[t]he essential characteristic of sexual harassment is that it is 
unwanted by the recipient, that it is for each individual to determine what behavior is 
acceptable to them and what they regard as offensive.” Commission Recommendation 
of 27 November 1991 on the Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work 
92/131/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 49) 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/ 
sga_doc?smatapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31992h0131&model=
guichett (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). See also, e.g., Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. 
Madek, An International Perspective on Sexual Harassment Law, 12 LAW & INEQ. 43, 
69-88 (1993). 
 62 Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 
419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 63 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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that an employer is vicariously liable for a supervisor’s 
harassment of a lower-level employee unless the employer can 
demonstrate that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . that 
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”64 The Court expanded on 
this holding in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,65 ruling 
that the difference between quid pro quo and hostile 
environment harassment does not control the issue of employer 
liability and that employers can be liable for either type of 
conduct, regardless of whether they were aware of the 
harassment.66  
The clarified standards for employer liability plainly 
indicate that employers have an affirmative duty to institute 
policies and procedures addressing and preventing sex 
harassment at the workplace, control mechanisms that in turn 
are precisely intended to shape employee behavior. Companies, 
as a result, are directly tackling the problem, many of them 
establishing more specific policies and educating employees 
about sex harassment, with some even implementing a code of 
ethics in the workplace.67 Employers should be taking notice; 
the number of sex harassment charges filed with the EEOC 
leapt from 10,532 in 1992 to 15,549 in 1995, and remained 
relatively constant through 2001, dipping somewhat in 2002 
  
 64 Id. at 807. 
 65 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 66 Id. at 754. The Court subsequently has ruled on a few additional sex 
harassment cases not dealing directly with work culture issues: Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998) (holding that in order for a school to be 
liable for teacher-student harassment, a school official with the authority to take 
corrective measures must have actual knowledge of, or act deliberately indifferent to, 
the offensive conduct); Davis ex. rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (applying the same strict standard specified in Gebser to student-
on-student sex harassment by holding that a school board is potentially liable only 
where it had actual notice and showed deliberate indifference); Clark County Sch. Dist. 
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271-72 (2001) (holding that an isolated incident, unless 
extremely serious, does not amount to sex harassment and that a right-to-sue letter 
issued by the EEOC to employee three months before supervisor announced possibly 
transferring employee was insufficient to show causality between employee’s protected 
activity and the adverse employment action); Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 
2342, 2346-47 (2004) (establishing that to make a constructive discharge claim due to 
hostile work environment sex harassment, the plaintiff must show that resignation 
was an appropriate response to unbearable conditions, to which the employer may then 
raise the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, provided that the employer did not 
engage in adverse employment actions).  
 67 Heather Pauly, Sex and the Workplace, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Aug. 26, 
1998, at 6. 
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and 2003.68 Awards paid in settlements with the EEOC likewise 
jumped from $12.7 million in 1992 to $50.3 million in 1999 and 
remained in the $50 million range through 2003, 
demonstrating the costly consequences of these suits.69  
As the Court explained in Faragher, “[Title VII’s] 
‘primary objective,’ like that of any statute meant to influence 
primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”70 
Avoiding a harm that is as common as workplace sex 
harassment can only be achieved by revising our notions of 
what is appropriate behavior in the workplace and no longer 
tolerating previously condoned harassing conduct. Under the 
recently articulated legal standards for employer liability, 
employers are directed to proactively influence and monitor the 
way the sexes interact in the workplace. And after Congress 
amended Title VII in 1991 to allow sex harassment victims to 
sue for damages, including punitive damages,71 employers have 
a strong incentive to do so. No magic required. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court appears to agree that 
Title VII was intended, at least in some measure, to modify our 
notion of what is acceptable in the workplace when it comes to 
harassment. The respondents in Oncale argued that 
“recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will transform 
Title VII into a general civility code for the American 
workplace,”72 but the Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
remarking that “[this] risk is no greater for same-sex than for 
opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by careful 
attention to the requirements of the statute.”73 If we assume 
that discrimination is a form of social behavior, then anti-
discrimination law must address social practices in the 
workplace that have discriminating effects. To this end, the 
Tenth Circuit’s concern about preventing a “cultural 
  
 68 U.S. EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 
1992 – FY 2003, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). 
14,396 charges and 13,566 charges were filed in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Id. 
 69 Id. This amount does not include monetary damages paid through 
litigation. Id. 
 70 524 U.S. at 806 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 
(1975)). 
 71 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)). This amendment allows harassment plaintiffs to obtain from 
$50,000 up to $300,000 in total damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (2000). 
 72 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 73 Id. (referring to Title VII’s requirement that the discrimination be on the 
basis of sex; that is, ‘“whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous 
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not 
exposed’”). 
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transformation” under Title VII misses the point of harassment 
law, and indeed, undermines it. 
B. Federal Government Survey: Impact on Employees 
Since enacting Title VII in 1964, Congress has shown 
concern about the problem of sex harassment within the 
federal government and in the late 1970s requested that the 
U.S. Merit System Protection Board74 conduct a study on the 
incidence and impact of sex harassment in federal worksites.75 
The Merit System Protection Board (“Board”) conducted its 
first study in 1980 and two follow-up studies in 1987 and 
1994.76 In the Introduction to the 1994 report, the Board stated:  
In confronting the issue of sexual harassment, the Federal 
Government is interested not only in avoiding situations in which a 
court would find a violation of law, but also in preventing the creation 
of an unpleasant, unproductive work atmosphere. The sexually 
harassing behaviors reported by survey respondents and discussed 
in this report—whether or not they are cause for legal action—can 
most definitely create an unproductive working environment and 
thus are an appropriate focus of our attention.77  
According to the report, the government is interested in 
going beyond curbing illegal conduct to also address any 
offensive conduct that can reduce the productivity and 
happiness of employees. Such an expansive perspective is 
directly contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s pronouncement; rather, 
such an approach is exactly concerned with affecting the 
general tenor of the workplace by increasing awareness and 
shaping attitudes regarding sex harassment.  
Attitudes certainly have been changing over time, as 
both men and women in the federal government are converging 
in their views of what falls under harassing behavior.78 
Through a survey of federal employees conducted in 1980, 
1987, and 1994, the Board found that both men and women 
considered a broader spectrum of behavior to constitute sex 
harassment, whether initiated by a coworker or supervisor and 
  
 74 The U.S. Merit System Protection Board is an independent agency 
responsible for examining the U.S. civil service system. 
 75 See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES, 1 (Oct. 1995), available at 
www.mspb.gov/studies/sexhar.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2005) [hereinafter SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE].  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 78 Id. at 5. 
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ranging from “pressure for sexual favors” to “sexual teasing, 
jokes, [and] remarks.”79 The survey also showed that federal 
employees were reflecting critically on how their behavior may 
be perceived by others at the workplace and were altering their 
conduct as a result, an outcome that the Board views as a 
positive step in sex harassment awareness.80 Importantly, 
despite critics’ concerns that the increased attention to sex 
harassment will stifle human relationships in the workplace,81 
the survey found that only a small minority of men and women 
believed that a “fear of being accused of [sex] harassment” had 
rendered their work environments less than comfortable.82 
This adjustment in public attitudes, at least among 
federal employees, is not surprising if we consider that sex 
harassment law has helped influence the way that certain 
workplace behavior is perceived.83 Just as progressive civil 
rights legislation in the 1960s helped change the nature of 
racial interaction despite considerable resistance,84 sex 
harassment law has helped facilitate a change in the nature of 
gender interaction. It is precisely when the law challenges 
deep-rooted discriminatory notions that the law does and must 
call for revised social norms. Social norms, though malleable, 
are slow to change but the law can precipitate new 
understandings of social behavior. To believe that sex 
harassment law can be efficacious without affecting underlying 
attitudes about women in the workplace is to misunderstand 
the core of the problem. Some legal observers may believe that 
the law should not act as the key apparatus for social reform,85 
  
 79 Id. at 7. 
 80 SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 75, at 9. 
 81 See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile 
Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 503 (2002) (stating that Title VII 
“inhibits social interactions and office relationships”). 
 82 SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 75, at 9 
(“Only 18 percent of men and 6 percent of women respondents agreed that fear of being 
accused of sexual harassment had made their organizations uncomfortable places to 
work. Apparently the increasingly acknowledged need for self-restraint doesn’t 
necessarily equate to discomfort on the job.”). 
 83 See Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law in the United States and 
South Africa: Facilitating the Transition from Legal Standards to Social Norms, 25 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 143, 190 (2002) (arguing that the legitimacy of sex harassment 
law depends upon harassment being viewed as “immoral behavior” that warrants 
government intervention because harassment “inflicts physical, emotional, 
psychological, and economic harm on its victims and society”).  
 84 Id. at 180. 
 85 See Martha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REV. 171, 171 
(1993) (stating that “there tend to be two kinds of people when it comes to the topic of 
‘law and social change’—those who believe that law is an important instrument of 
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but the law does function as a type of social code. The law, as a 
set of social rules, helps to organize society and holds people 
accountable for their actions. The cultural legitimacy of sex 
harassment law further can be strengthened through popular 
culture and the media in terms of how the issue of sex 
harassment is conveyed to the public, including the public 
response to employers accused of sex harassment.86  
IV.  THE CLASS DEBATE: BLUE-COLLAR V. WHITE-COLLAR? 
According to a study that examined every federal 
judicial opinion on workplace sex harassment for a period of 
ten years after Meritor, harassment plaintiffs in these cases 
were predominately women and predominately blue-collar or 
clerical.87 In the federal district court opinions that mentioned 
the occupational status of the plaintiff, 38% of the plaintiffs 
were blue-collar, 29% were clerical employees, 21% were 
management and white-collar, and 12% were professional.88 
Furthermore, hostile environment claims made up the vast 
majority of sex harassment claims, with 70% of the cases 
involving only a hostile environment claim and 22.5% of the 
cases involving both hostile environment and quid pro quo 
claims.89 The large number of hostile environment harassment 
cases that get filed in court demonstrate that sex harassment is 
a broad societal problem, and not simply the result of a few 
“bad apples” in the workplace.  
Additionally, hostile environment claims more 
frequently arose out of majority-male work settings, whereas 
mixed-sex workplaces produced a greater percentage of quid 
pro quo charges.90 The connection between instances of hostile 
environment harassment and male-dominated workplaces is 
important and strongly suggests that the mostly-male 
composition of the workplace plays a role in fostering a type of 
  
social change and those who think not”). 
 86 See Zalesne, supra note 83, at 216-17. 
 87 Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 560-61 (2001) (“Only 5.4% of the plaintiffs (a total of twenty-
seven) are men . . . .”). 
 88 Id. at 561 (stating that the plaintiff’s occupation was provided in 90% of 
the cases). 
 89 Id. at 565. This study examined 502 district court opinions and 164 
appellate court opinions. Id. at 556. 
 90 Id. at 565-66 (“In the eighty-eight mostly-male workplace cases, only 17% 
include a quid pro quo claim and 83% rely solely on hostile environment claims. In the 
145 mixed-workplace cases, by contrast, 34% include quid pro quo claims and only 66% 
rely solely on hostile environment claims.”). 
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environment that women find harassing and discriminatory. 
The pervasiveness of sex harassment in both blue-collar and 
white-collar jobs further indicates that class norms are not 
driving this phenomenon.  
Some courts, however, both pre- and post-Oncale, have 
mistakenly concentrated on the class culture of the workplace 
as part of their totality and social context analysis, causing a 
Circuit divide.91 Among the Circuit courts, the Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have largely 
taken into account workplace culture in terms of class when 
assessing a harassment claim.92 On the other end of the 
spectrum, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have declined 
to factor in workplace class culture.93 The Circuits that give 
special treatment to class culture are primarily motivated by 
formalist and administrative concerns, whereas the Circuits 
that refuse to take this approach are motivated by equality 
concerns.94 
A.  Special Treatment of Class Context 
One of the first court decisions that considered 
workplace culture was Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co.95 The 
plaintiff, Patricia Gross, was hired as a water truck driver with 
a construction company and was supervised by George Randall 
Anderson.96 In asserting her Title VII claim, Gross alleged that 
Anderson harassed her by calling her parts of the female 
anatomy and remarking to another employee, “Mark, 
sometimes don’t you just want to smash a woman in the face?”97 
The district court granted the defendant construction 
company’s motion for summary judgment, and Gross 
  
 91 See Frank, supra note 81, at 438-41.  
 92 See, e.g., Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. 
Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997); Montandon v. Farmland Indus., 116 
F.3d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1997); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537-38 
(10th Cir. 1995); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991); Vaughn v. Pool 
Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1982).  
 93 See, e.g., O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735 (1st Cir. 2001); 
Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 194 (4th Cir. 2000); Jackson v. 
Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 1999); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 
F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999).  
 94 Frank, supra note 81, at 440-41. 
 95 53 F.3d 1531 (1995). 
 96 Id. at 1535. 
 97 Id. at 1536. 
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appealed.98 The Tenth Circuit fully embraced the idea that 
Gross’ work environment should be evaluated according to its 
blue-collar nature “where crude language is commonly used by 
male and female employees. Speech that might be offensive or 
unacceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of 
Congress, is tolerated in other work environments.”99 Citing 
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,100 the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
that different workplace norms may exist in certain work 
environments: 
[Otherwise,] [t]he standard for determining sex[ual] harassment 
would be different depending upon the work environment. Indeed, it 
cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, 
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, 
sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII 
was not meant to—or can—change this.101  
The Tenth Circuit compared the construction setting of 
Gross’ job with that of a prep school faculty meeting or the 
Congress floor to conclude that different speech is acceptable in 
different types of workplaces. In dismissing Gross’ claim, the 
Court concluded that crude language in a blue-collar 
environment is part of the workplace culture and does not rise 
to the level of actionable gender-based harassment and 
discrimination under Title VII.102 The court preferred to defer to 
the already-existing “rough-hewn” culture of the blue-collar 
environment rather than use Title VII to help bring about a 
cultural change in the workplace with respect to gender 
relations. 
These courts gave special consideration to the class 
context of the workplace because they believe it is highly 
pertinent to assessing the objective and subjective severity of 
the alleged conduct.103 In defending this approach, at least one 
law review article posits that factoring in “workplace culture” 
(defined in terms of class) can serve to better differentiate 
between unrefined teasing and a serious case of harassment.104 
The benefits would include reducing some of the ambiguity 
present in hostile environment law to promote consistency and 
  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1538. 
 100 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).  
 101 Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538 (quoting Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430). 
 102 Id. at 1538, 1547. 
 103 See Frank, supra note 81, at 466. 
 104 Id. at 490. 
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certainty in the legal outcomes of these cases.105 Under this 
view, narrowing the current standards would also cut down on 
the number of harassment cases that increasingly occupy 
federal and state court dockets.106  
B.  Non-Special Treatment of Class Context 
Despite its previous ruling in Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit 
ruled the other way in Williams v. General Motors Corp.107 In 
this case, plaintiff Marilyn Williams worked the midnight shift 
in a plant warehouse, distributing materials used at the plant 
to assemblers.108 She alleged that during her employment in 
this shift, she was harassed by her coworkers and male 
supervisor in a series of both sexual and nonsexual ways, 
creating a hostile work environment based on her gender in 
violation of Title VII.109 The district court denied relief by 
granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, and 
Williams appealed.110  
The Sixth Circuit in Williams explicitly declined to 
adopt a different severity standard for a hostile environment 
according to the work culture and openly stated its 
disagreement with the Circuit decision in Gross:  
We do not believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-
dominated trades relinquishes her right to be free from sexual 
harassment; indeed, we find this reasoning to be illogical, because it 
means that the more hostile the environment, and the more 
prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a Title VII plaintiff 
to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
constitute a hostile work environment. Surely women working in the 
trades do not deserve less protection from the law than women 
working in a courthouse.111 
As the Williams Court observed, factoring in the blue- 
or white-collar nature of the workplace creates two tiers of 
protection under Title VII, and makes it more problematic for 
women in blue-collar fields to obtain legal redress for hostile 
environment harassment by requiring them to show a level of 
vulgarity above and beyond the normative culture of the trade. 
  
 105 Id. at 492. 
 106 See id.  
 107 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 108 Id. at 559. 
 109 Id. at 559-60. 
 110 Id. at 560. 
 111 Id. at 564. 
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The First Circuit in O’Rourke v. City of Providence112 
followed the approach of the Sixth Circuit. In O’Rourke, the 
plaintiff was hired as a firefighter with the City of Providence 
Fire Department.113 Starting from her training period and 
continuing throughout her employment as a line firefighter, the 
plaintiff was the target of a constant discriminatory campaign 
that included her being subjected to sexually disparaging 
comments, sexual taunts, pornographic material, and 
differential treatment by her supervisors.114 Although the City, 
relying on Gross, posited that the conduct of the plaintiff’s 
coworkers needed to be considered within the blue-collar 
context of the firefighting industry, the First Circuit declined to 
embrace this different standard for the same reasons 
articulated by the Williams court.115 
The Williams and O’Rourke Courts in essence provided 
an equality rationale for rejecting workplace culture as a 
relevant factor in assessing harassment claims: women in blue-
collar fields should not have to endure considerably more 
“coarseness” in order for their claims to come within the 
protective ambit of Title VII.116 While the equality argument is 
a compelling one, it poses the problem of relativism in that 
such an argument seeks to focus only on equality of status 
rather than on elevation of status.117 In other words, courts 
could simply require all workers to demonstrate the level of 
vulgarity currently demanded of blue-collar plaintiffs and still 
ensure equal, albeit inadequate, protection. Courts instead 
should aim not only to equalize but also to enhance the 
protection afforded to all working women by advocating for an 
equal and better standard.  
As previously discussed, courts that give special 
emphasis to workplace culture offer legalist reasons for 
adopting such an approach, including: certainty, predictability, 
and uniformity of decisions.118 But these goals would also be 
achieved if all courts were to refrain from giving special 
treatment to workplace culture. Further, while these objectives 
may be desirable, they should not be prioritized at the expense 
of failing to address the common and pervasive nature of sex 
  
 112 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 113 Id. at 717. 
 114 Id. at 718-25. 
 115 Id. at 735. 
 116 See id.; Williams, 187 F.3d at 564. 
 117 I owe thanks to Robin West for her insight on this point. 
 118 Frank, supra note 81, at 492. 
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harassment, an area of the law difficult to demarcate with 
bright lines. Sex harassment, especially in the form of hostile 
environment, should be addressed in its widespread form 
under anti-discrimination law according to Title VII’s “broad 
rule of workplace equality.”119 The ubiquitous nature of sex 
harassment at work may make it more difficult to regulate 
efficiently, but it is no less a serious harm simply because it is 
so widespread.   
Those who see Title VII as overbroad and vague may be 
concerned about the law’s possible chilling effect on speech, 
particularly speech that is regulated based on its content and 
viewpoint, such as crude or sexist language.120 The First 
Amendment right is not absolute, however, and the Supreme 
Court has held that the government may prohibit or limit 
certain categories of speech, including fighting words, 121 
offensive speech,122 and obscenity,123 all of which may apply to 
the kinds of vulgar and derogatory comments and materials 
that make up the facts in hostile environment claims.124 The 
Supreme Court has been more wary of restricting speech on the 
basis of point of view, holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul125 that 
discriminatory fighting words that express a specific viewpoint 
are protected under the First Amendment. But the Court in 
R.A.V. differentiated Title VII’s regulation of sexually 
harassing conduct from the statute at issue:  
[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not 
against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for 
example, is violated by telling the enemy the nation’s defense 
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable 
class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a 
statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, 
  
 119 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); MACKINNON, supra 
note 6, at 96-97.  
 120 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 81, at 499. 
 121 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (holding that 
“fighting words” or “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace” are not constitutionally protected speech).  
 122 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-50 (1978) (holding that it is 
constitutional to restrict “indecent” speech, especially when it is directed toward a 
captive audience). 
 123 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (holding that “patently 
offensive” sexually-oriented speech has minimal First Amendment protection).  
 124 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, RICHARD F. RICHARDS, & 
DEBORAH A. CALLOWAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 603-
11 (2000). 
 125 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (involving a cross-burning statute that prohibited 
symbols that would create “anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender”). 
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sexually derogatory “fighting words,” among other words, may 
produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual 
discrimination in employment practices . . . . Where the government 
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts 
are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a 
discriminatory idea or philosophy.126 
According to the Court’s dicta, harassing speech is 
proscribable under Title VII because the speech is construed as 
discriminatory conduct. Free speech advocates may believe 
that the freedom of private individuals to speak outweighs the 
competing interest in nondiscrimination, but the high Court 
appears to be willing to tolerate the incidental effect on speech 
involved in prohibiting discriminatory behavior in the 
workplace. 
V.  DEBUNKING THE ASSUMPTIONS 
A.  Judicial Depictions of Blue-Collar Norms 
As one peruses the court decisions in hostile 
environment harassment cases, one can identify a pattern 
among the judicial depictions of blue-collar behavioral norms. 
The judiciary in large part has not attempted to deliver 
informed and empathetic decisions about the plight of blue-
collar targets of harassment, but instead has offered detached 
and thin observations about the blue-collar workplace.127 The 
distance that some judges place between themselves and blue-
collar workers is made evident in their court opinions. The 
Tenth Circuit’s proclamation in Gross that crude speech is 
“tolerated” in the blue-collar environment but would be 
“offensive or unacceptable” in a white-collar setting such as a 
“prep school faculty meeting” or “on the floor of Congress” 
exemplifies the exaggerated notions of what goes on in the 
“rough and tumble” blue-collar work world.128  
In addition to implying that blue-collar environments 
have lower standards of decorum than white-collar 
environments, such judicial opinions beg the question of why 
  
 126 Id. at 389-90 (citations omitted).  
 127 Martha Nussbaum maintains that in addition to “technical legal 
knowledge, a knowledge of history and precedent, [and] careful attention to proper 
legal impartiality[,] . . . judges must also be capable of fancy and sympathy” if they are 
to issue “fully rational” decisions. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE 
LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 121 (1995). 
 128 Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (1995). 
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harassing speech that would be found unacceptable by white-
collar employees should be good and fine for their blue-collar 
counterparts. It is difficult to ignore the classism that taints 
these observations. In Rabidue, the appellate court provided a 
similar line of stereotypical reasoning, agreeing with the 
district court that “[s]exual jokes, sexual conversations and 
girlie magazines may abound” in “some work 
environments”129—referring to blue-collar environments. Other 
courts have contrasted the blue-collar environment to that of a 
Victorian parlor,130 using sarcasm to portray what they view as 
the prudish claims of blue-collar female plaintiffs in 
harassment suits and to downplay the offensive working 
conditions alleged.131 In Williams, Judge Ryan of the Sixth 
Circuit stated in his dissent that “[t]he shop floor is a rough 
and indelicate environment in which finishing school manners 
are not the behavioral norm,”132 suggesting that blue-collar 
settings are devoid of much civility.  
The federal judiciary, however, consists of an elite group 
of professionals who, secluded in their chambers, are far 
removed from the blue-collar workplace and the daily habits of 
the working-class.133 As such, they seem to accept at face value 
that blue-collar employees have a cultural proclivity toward the 
profane and vulgar, and rely on this assumption to make 
sweeping generalizations about “blue-collar culture.” Given 
that sex harassment injures women in the workplace and 
interferes with their employment to keep them economically 
vulnerable, it is troubling that judges have begun explicitly 
using class differentiation to condone harassment against 
women already socio-economically disadvantaged by their 
  
 129 Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing 
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). 
 130 See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 
(5th Cir. 1995) (maintaining that “a less onerous standard of [Title VII sex harassment] 
liability would attempt to insulate women from everyday insults as if they remained 
models of Victorian reticence.”); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 
1988) (stating that “Title VII does not mandate an employment environment worthy of 
a Victorian salon.”).  
 131 See Rebecca Brannan, When the Pig is in the Barnyard, Not the Parlor: 
Should Courts Apply a “Coarseness Factor” in Analyzing Blue-Collar Hostile Work 
Environment Claims?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 811 (2001). 
 132 Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 571 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 133 See, e.g., Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big 
Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 
516 (1996) (noting that “judges tend to come from an upper-class background, or at 
least have reached the upper classes, and may favor upper-class or corporate 
litigants”).  
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occupations. Further, such a differentiation serves to promote 
the harmful public policy of maintaining permanent class 
distinctions in our society.134 
B.  Vulgarity Along the Workplace Spectrum 
Notwithstanding the exaggerated depictions, pitting the 
behavioral norms of the trades against the professions is both 
unsettling and inaccurate. Vulgar language and crude behavior 
routinely takes place not only on the shop-floor but also in the 
office space. One only need recall that the outrageous 
harassing incidents in Meritor took place in the “professional” 
white-collar setting of a bank, where the branch’s vice-
president showed himself to be no model of refinement.135  
Sex harassment cases set in white-collar environments 
are replete with instances of vulgar language. For instance, in 
Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance, Inc.,136 the plaintiff 
worked in a financial services office as an accounts service 
representative.137 In this small office setting where everyone 
shared an open working space without any walls or partitions, 
the plaintiff’s supervisor publicly commented that she should 
“get a little this weekend” so that she could return “in a better 
mood,” that she would be “the worst piece of ass that I ever 
had,” and that she “must be a sad piece of ass” who “can’t keep 
a man.”138 The supervisor also made at least one racially 
offensive remark to the plaintiff when he said that she “would 
find a decent man if [she] just quit dating Mexicans.”139  
The court in Smith distinguished the employment 
setting in this case from that in Gross,140 stating: “This is not a 
factual scenario like that in Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 
where the rough and tumble surroundings of the construction 
industry can make vulgarity and sexual epithets common and 
  
 134 While this article argues that class does not and should not matter in the 
adjudication of hostile environment harassment claims, this is not to suggest that class 
or socio-economic status is not an important consideration in other social contexts or 
with respect to other legal claims. The argument presented here only aims to show that 
sex harassment is linked to traditional masculine norms in the workplace, and as such 
should not be trivialized because of the class context of the plaintiff’s work 
environment. 
 135 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See supra notes 14-20 
and accompanying text. 
 136 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 137 Id. at 1412.  
 138 Id. at 1414. 
 139 Id.  
 140 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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reasonable conduct.”141 The Tenth Circuit in Smith accepted 
Gross’ holding that more extreme and coarse conduct can be 
“reasonable” in certain class-affiliated industries, but implied 
that this standard does not apply to the “genteel” setting of the 
financial industry. Thus the plaintiff was allowed to recover on 
her hostile work environment sex harassment claim,142 although 
she likely would not have prevailed if she had been a blue-
collar employee.  
Alternatively, the court in a white-collar harassment 
case may invoke the personality norms of an individual to pin 
the offending behavior on the person rather than on the work 
environment. Such an approach allows the court to maintain 
its class-based expectation regarding the white-collar work 
setting. In Gleason v. Mesirow Financial, Inc.,143 another case 
set against the polished backdrop of a financial firm, the 
Seventh Circuit observed that “vulgar banter, tinged with 
sexual innuendo” cannot be completely avoided in the “modern 
workplace.”144 Acknowledging the liberal use of coarse language 
described in the facts of this case, the court implied that 
vulgarity is certainly not limited to the working-class context.145 
But the court also depicted the firm’s supervisor as particularly 
“coarse and boorish,” specific personality traits that spilled into 
his workplace behavior.146 In attributing the conduct to the 
particular individual, it appears that the court attempted to 
preserve the pristine appearance of the white-collar workplace 
by suggesting that it was an aberrational individual and not 
the culture of the work environment that caused the 
harassment.  
In yet another white-collar harassment case,147 the court 
noted that the plaintiff and her supervisor merely had different 
working styles (the plaintiff was “straight-laced” whereas her 
supervisor was “more informal” and “relaxed”),148 implying that 
the plaintiff might have over-reacted to her boss’ “friendly and 
perhaps romantic” but not harassing actions.149 One of his 
“relaxed” remarks included the following: “You cold northern 
  
 141 Smith, 129 F.3d at 1414 (citation omitted). 
 142 Id. at 1419. 
 143 118 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 144 Id. at 1144. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ga. 1991). 
 148 Id. at 799. 
 149 See id. at 800. 
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bitch. Why don’t you give us southern boys a break and say yes 
once in a while?”150 He further commented to the plaintiff that 
she, in her position as the secretary for membership services at 
the private club where she worked, could offer sex to encourage 
prospective members to join.151 The court conceded that sexual 
innuendos were commonplace in the plaintiff’s work 
environment, but nonetheless held that the crude and 
suggestive conversation at issue did not amount to actionable 
harassment.152 
The facts in these cases vividly show that coarse 
language and behavior infiltrate all kinds of workplaces, 
regardless of the class association of the specific work setting or 
type of industry. Coarseness may be more visible in blue-collar 
environments (in the form of pin-ups and other visual markers 
of crude sexuality) perhaps because blue-collar employees 
generally do not need to maintain presentable workspaces for 
clients, whereas white-collar employees have a public image to 
consider.  
However, crudeness may also openly thrive in visual 
form even in white-collar office environments. In Brennan v. 
Metropolitan Opera Ass’n,153 the female plaintiff, who worked as 
an Assistant Stage Director at the Metropolitan Opera 
Association (“Met”), complained that the coworker with whom 
she shared an office had pinned up postcard-sized pictures of 
nude and semi-nude men on one of the office’s bulletin boards.154 
A couple of the pictures were cut so that only the bodies were 
displayed.155 When the plaintiff took down the pictures and told 
her coworker that she found them offensive, her coworker did 
not respond but re-posted the pictures.156 Although the plaintiff 
informed her supervisor about the pictures, they remained on 
the bulletin board for the rest of the plaintiff’s tenure at the 
Met.157  
The court ruled that these pictures did not create a 
hostile work environment because the plaintiff lacked evidence 
to show that they were a hindrance to her work performance.158 
  
 150 Id.  
 151 Id. at 799. 
 152 Fox, 761 F. Supp. at 801. 
 153 192 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 154 Id. at 315. 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Brennan, 192 F.3d at 319.  
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The court did not mention the workplace culture of the Met; it 
only stated that the pictures were “arguably inappropriate in a 
work setting.”159 This case illustrates that white-collar 
workplaces are not necessarily clean of visual coarseness, as 
employees may bring lewd materials to the office for either 
private or office consumption.  
Thus, despite some courts’ tendency to want to 
distinguish between the blue-collar shop and the white-collar 
suite when it comes to sex harassment, their class expectations 
do not hold true. Courts invoke either the nature of the 
workplace or the nature of the individual to explain the 
offending vulgarities at issue and to maintain their class-
defined conceptions of the specific work environment. Adjusting 
the explanation for the harassing conduct, however, does not 
change the facts behind the harassment: crude behavior exists 
along the workplace spectrum, demonstrating that even while 
the industry setting changes, the behavior does not.  
C.  Sex Harassment and the Cultural Defense Argument 
The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings propelled the 
issue of sex harassment into the public limelight in 1991.160 
During the Senate confirmation hearings for Thomas’ 
nomination to the Supreme Court, Hill testified that Thomas 
had harassed her while she worked for him, first at the 
Department of Education and then again, ironically, at the 
EEOC.161 The conversations that Hill recounted having had 
with Thomas at work are not at all tame, and could match the 
vulgarity of anything said on the factory floor:  
[Judge Thomas] would call me into his office for reports on education 
issues and projects or he might suggest that . . . we go to lunch to a 
government cafeteria. After a brief discussion of work, he would turn 
the conversation to a discussion of sexual matters. His conversations 
were very vivid. He spoke about acts that he had seen in 
pornographic films involving such matters as women having sex 
with animals, and films showing group sex or rape scenes. He talked 
about pornographic materials depicting individuals with large 
penises, or large breasts involved in various sex acts.162 
  
 159 Id.  
 160 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., pt. 4 (1991) [hereinafter Hill-Thomas Hearings].  
 161 Id. at 36-38. 
 162 Id. at 37. 
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Hill’s testimony included another crude incident that 
she stated occurred at Thomas’ office at the EEOC, where he 
made the now infamous comment, “Who has put pubic hair on 
my Coke?”163 According to Hill, Thomas also told her about an 
individual he had seen in some pornographic material with the 
name “Long John Silver.”164 If these allegations about Thomas 
are true, then vulgarity knows no boundaries and pervades 
even the high-level government office.  
Despite the white-collar context of Hill’s workplace, 
some Senators clearly wanted evidence of extreme vulgarity in 
Thomas’ actions before conceding that Thomas may have 
harassed Hill.165 Senator Arlen Specter began his interrogation 
of Hill with “You testified this morning . . . that the most 
embarrassing question involved—this is not too bad—women’s 
large breasts. That is a word we use all the time. That was the 
most embarrassing aspect of what Judge Thomas had said to 
you.”166 Aside from the fact that Senator Specter was 
  
 163 Id. at 38. 
 164 Id. at 56. 
 165 In response to the Senate’s unrelenting quest to discover the most lurid of 
details regarding the harassment allegations, Hill shared her thoughts on the ordeal in 
her autobiographical account of the hearings: “How many times . . . how much detail . . 
. how vulgar did the language have to be and . . . how uncomfortable do I have to feel in 
order for [them] to comprehend what happened to me?” ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH 
TO POWER 178 (1997) (ellipses and brackets in original). 
 166 Hill-Thomas Hearings, supra note 160, at 61. Another significant aspect of 
Hill’s allegations is that she, a black woman, was charging a black man of sexual 
impropriety. As a result, racial as well as gender politics came into play, as shown by 
the fact that Thomas characterized the hearing as a “high-tech lynching.” Id. at 157. As 
Kimberlé Crenshaw points out, it should have been clear that the lynching metaphor 
did not apply to Thomas’ situation, primarily because this was an intra-racial case and 
lynching was historically used by the white mob to victimize black men who had been 
suspected of raping white women. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? 
Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST 
LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES 832-33 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996). But Thomas 
strategically deployed this powerful symbol of racial oppression to bring his racial 
identity as a black male to the fore and make this case one of race discrimination 
rather than sex harassment. See generally Emma Coleman Jordan, The Power of False 
Racial Memory and the Metaphor of Lynching, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN 
AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS 37 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma 
Coleman Jordan eds., 1995). Simultaneously, Hill’s identity as a black woman receded 
into the background and Thomas’ misplaced metaphor went unchallenged. See A. Leon 
Higginbotham, Jr., The Hill-Thomas Hearings—What Took Place and What Happened: 
White Male Domination, Black Male Domination and the Denigration of Black Women, 
in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS 
HEARINGS 32-33 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995). The changed 
focus of the hearings too clearly illustrates how accusations of racism can take 
precedence over accusations of sexism, as our national leaders tend to tread more 
carefully around the issue of possible race bias. Crenshaw, supra, at 832 (“Thomas’s 
move to drape himself in a history of black male repression was particularly effective in 
the all-white male Senate, whose members could not muster the moral authority to 
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attempting to mischaracterize Hill’s statement, his remark also 
demonstrates that crude speech (at least involving “women’s 
large breasts”) is apparently tolerated on the floor of Congress.  
In the wake of the Hill-Thomas hearings, Harvard 
sociologist Orlando Patterson put forth a cultural critique of 
Hill’s harassment claim.167 In a New York Times op-ed piece, 
Patterson argued that even if Thomas did engage in the sexual 
talk that Hill alleged, Thomas’ behavior could not be construed 
as sex harassment because he was only using the “down-home 
style of courting” supposedly characteristic of interaction 
between black women and black men.168 According to Patterson, 
even if the allegations were accurate, Thomas would be 
justified in lying during the hearings because most of the 
nation would not comprehend that such sexual teasing is a part 
of black courtship practice.169 Despite the fact that there was no 
“back-and-forth sexual banter” in Hill’s case in that she did not 
play the part of the “repart-ee” to Thomas’ “repart-or,”170 
Patterson questioned whether Hill was truly harmed by the 
alleged comments, responding incredulously to her disregard 
for black mating practices and her uninformed reaction.171  
Even assuming that the sexual banter described by 
Patterson is a part of the black cultural dating script, there is 
no reason to further assume that black women actually desire 
this style of courting, notwithstanding their familiarity with 
it.172 In fact, such a reading of women’s wants ignores the larger 
socio-historical context of gender relations and how men have 
been allowed to define what women apparently desire.173 
Women are familiar with sex harassment and a host of other 
offensive and abusive behavior that have long been socially 
condoned in our history of unequal power between the 
  
challenge Thomas’s sensationalist characterization.”).  
 167 Orlando Patterson, Editorial, Race, Gender, and Liberal Fallacies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, § 4, at 15. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id.  
 170 See Hill-Thomas Hearings, supra note 160, at 37 (demonstrating that 
Anita Hill maintained throughout her testimony that she on several occasions told 
Thomas that she found his comments inappropriate, and never said anything to 
suggest that she welcomed or appreciated his sexual remarks).  
 171 Patterson, supra note 167. 
 172 See Crenshaw, supra note 166, at 838.  
 173 See Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A 
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 81 (1987) 
(arguing that “women suffer more than men” and that “women often find painful the 
same objective event or condition that men find pleasurable”).  
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genders.174 Therefore whether Hill was aware of any such 
“down-home style of courting” is irrelevant, especially given 
that the alleged conduct took place within the hierarchical 
setting of the workplace where Thomas was her superior.175 
Unlike how Patterson portrays it, sex harassment is not a 
dating problem;176 women employees find sex harassment 
abusive and debilitating because it denies them equal dignity 
and opportunity in the public realm of work.177 
Patterson’s argument is basically a cultural defense 
argument in that he attempts to explain and excuse Thomas’ 
behavior by introducing a black cultural custom to show that 
Thomas did not act with the intent to harass.178 Primarily 
employed in criminal law, immigrant defendants have asserted 
a cultural defense in cases of spousal murder, positing that 
they acted in accordance with their particular cultural (i.e., not 
American) mandates, and thus should be judged against a 
different and culturally-sensitive standard.179 The cultural 
defense can also be likened to the “provocation defense” or 
“heat of passion” defense, raised in intimate homicide cases.180 
Under the provocation defense, men who kill in passion are 
partially justified because they could not maintain self-
restraint in cases of adultery.181 Just as these defenses serve to 
  
 174 Other culturally-sanctioned behavior that women have had to endure 
include rape (both stranger- and acquaintance-rape), domestic violence, and stalking. 
See, e.g., Lee, supra note 12, at 389-405 (tracing the history of stalking behavior from 
ancient to modern times and illustrating that stalking activity has been culturally 
encouraged and facilitated by Western notions of romance). 
 175 Crenshaw, supra note 166, at 837 (noting that Patterson’s argument fails 
to differentiate between the private personal world and the public work world in the 
way that men and women interact). 
 176 Id. at 838. 
 177 See generally MACKINNON, supra note 6.  
 178 See Crenshaw, supra note 166, at 835; Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: 
Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 57, 57 (1994) (“The 
‘cultural defense’ is a legal strategy that defendants use in attempts to excuse criminal 
behavior or to mitigate culpability based on a lack of requisite mens rea.”). 
 179 See Volpp, supra note 178, at 57. One such case is People v. Dong Lu Chen, 
in which a Chinese immigrant accused his wife of infidelity and murdered her in 
accordance with “Chinese culture” for bringing shame onto the family. Persuading the 
trial judge of his cultural defense, the defendant was granted probation instead of a 
prison sentence. Id. at 64-77. 
 180 See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the 
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331,1339-44 (1997). 
 181 Id. at 1339. The long-held image of intimate murder involved provocation 
due to sexual infidelity, but Nourse points out that many of the actual cases in which 
the provocation defense is used do not concern adultery but a failed relationship in 
which the woman left or tried to leave. In case after case, the male defendant who 
killed his partner or ex-partner in the “heat of passion” could realistically hope to 
receive a lighter sentence based on his “‘extreme emotional disturbance.’” Id. at 1342-
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shield the lover-killer from liability, the blue-collar workplace 
defense serves to shield the worker-harasser from liability. 
These subculture-specific arguments fail to grasp that sexual 
violence and gender subordination cross cultural and class 
lines. Patterson’s claim that Hill was not a harassment victim 
because she is black is analogous to the class culture claim that 
the blue-collar woman is not a harassment victim because she 
is blue-collar.  
The problem of sexism in conjunction with racial and 
cultural stereotyping presents an especially grievous problem 
for black and other minority women workers. Stereotypical 
images of colored women and their sexuality have dominated 
America’s view of the “other” and whet some men’s fetishizing 
appetites.182 African-American women, for example, are seen as 
sexually available and aggressive women who do not need 
protection from unwanted sex because they crave sexual 
liaisons.183 Asian-American women are viewed as sexually 
submissive and exotic, while Latina women are perceived as 
sexually fiery with hot tempers and a sexual attitude to 
match.184 The stereotyped sexual personality of a minority 
woman operates to objectify her as a woman and as a woman of 
her specific color, thus making her the target of an ugly blend 
of both sex and race harassment. 
In addition to being discriminated against on the basis 
of their gender and particular race, immigrant women are 
further vulnerable to sex harassment because their precarious 
status in society makes it even more difficult for them to 
challenge their abusive working conditions. These workers may 
have limited language skills as well as limited knowledge about 
their legal rights, and may fear being deported for complaining, 
  
43. 
 182 See, e.g., Adele Logan Alexander, “She’s No Lady, She’s a Nigger”: Abuses, 
Stereotypes, and Realities from the Middle Passage to Capitol (and Anita) Hill, in RACE, 
GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS 14-16 
(Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995); Regina Austin, Sapphire 
Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 570-72 (1989) (describing the popular image of the 
black woman as a “Jezebel,” a loose woman who flaunts her sexuality); Sumi K. Cho, 
Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority 
Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 191 (1997) (noting that Asian 
Pacific women are stereotypically viewed as “exotic, hyper-eroticized, masochistic, 
desirous of sexual domination”); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace 
Harassment of Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 820 (1993) 
(identifying the stereotype of Latina women as “hot-blooded” and very sexual).  
 183 See generally Alexander, supra note 182; Austin, supra note 182. 
 184 See generally Cho, supra note 182; Ontiveros, supra note 182. 
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depending on their immigration status.185  Immigrant women 
are commonly harassed,186 prompting EEOC suits such as the 
class action against Grace Culinary Systems, Inc. and 
Townsend Culinary, Inc. for allegedly maintaining harassing 
and hostile work conditions for twenty-two of their immigrant 
female workers, a case that ultimately settled for $1 million.187 
These immigrant women were low-wage workers at a food-
processing plant and were forced to deal with their managers’ 
groping and requests for sexual favors over a period of several 
years.188 The problem of sex harassment thus reaches and 
harms immigrant female laborers, who are many times 
disadvantaged because of gender, class, race, ethnicity, and 
alienage.189  
On a fundamental level, the problem of sex harassment 
affects and harms women of all backgrounds and in all 
occupations. The larger conversation needs to be steered away 
from the false distinction between blue- and white-collar 
environments. Rather, the discussion should be recast in terms 
of masculine workplace norms discriminating against and 
encumbering female workers,190 preventing their significant, if 
not equal, foothold in the labor market.  
VI.  REFRAMING THE DISCUSSION: MASCULINE, NOT CLASS, 
WORKPLACE NORMS 
Characterizing vulgar behavior that women find 
harassing as either class-based or individually-determined 
neglects to protect women workers and fails to provide equal 
opportunity in the workplace as required under Title VII. 
Harassment should not be understood as lying on a spectrum of 
  
 185 See Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most In Need: Undocumented 
Workers’ Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 607, 
620-21 (1993-1994). 
 186 Id. at 620. 
 187 Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC 
Obtains $1 Million for Low-Wage Workers Who Were Sexually Harassed at Food 
Processing Plant (June 1, 2000), at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-1-00.html (last visited 
April 22, 2005). 
 188 Id. 
 189 While I do not presume to offer here a thorough discussion of how a woman 
may experience sex harassment with respect to her race, ethnicity, and alienage, I 
nevertheless seek to at least incorporate some of these concerns into this article, 
because the experiences of all women should be considered to fully address the problem 
of sex harassment. 
 190 Masculine norms, heterosexual in tradition, similarly discriminate against 
non-conforming male workers. See discussion supra on Oncale in Part II. 
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class-influenced normative behavior, but viewed as the product 
of the socio-cultural normative behavior of men in the 
workplace. Blue-collar men harass blue-collar women in their 
shared workplaces while white-collar men harass white-collar 
women in their same places of work. Consequently, gender 
hostility—at times along with racial and ethnic hostility—is 
predominately steering the harassment, and not class norms.191 
A.  Sex Harassment As Male Normative Behavior 
Sex harassment acts to keep the workplace a site of 
male power and traditional cultural masculinity.192 As Kathryn 
Abrams has cogently asserted in her scholarship on sex 
harassment, work settings reproduce male-associated practices 
and preferences that communicate men’s dominant social 
influence.193 Masculine preferences mold the work 
atmosphere—demonstrated for instance through sexually-
oriented chatter and horseplay—and this conduct becomes 
viewed as “normal” for the workplace rather than a product of 
masculine partiality and privilege.194 Threatened by the 
increasing entry of women into the labor market, especially 
into traditionally male jobs, employers and employees have 
responded by forcefully maintaining and insisting upon their 
normative masculine behavior, resulting in instances of sex 
harassment.195  
At its core, sex harassment is about conventional 
masculine behavioral norms that operate to harm women 
  
 191 I do believe, however, that class prejudice can lead to abuse at work apart 
from sex harassment. Regina Austin has argued that class or occupational prejudice 
and elitism, in conjunction with racist and sexist attitudes, can operate to oppress 
working-class employees. See generally Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker 
Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1988). 
 192 See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1205-12 (1998).  
 193 Id. at 1210. 
 194 Id. Locating the problem of sex harassment within the larger context of 
gender hierarchy, as described here, focuses on socially-constructed masculine versus 
feminine norms rather than on biological sex. This argument converges with Katherine 
Franke’s “hetero-patriarchal” analytical framework regarding sex harassment which 
focuses on the devaluation of femininity vis-à-vis masculinity and the maintenance and 
regulation of gender norms. See generally Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with 
Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997). Abrams both builds upon and 
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Abrams, supra note 187, at 1193-1204.  
 195 Abrams, supra note 192, at 1206-10.  
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economically, physically, emotionally, and sexually. 
Traditionally male-dominated fields of work are just that—
male dominated—and hence it is unsurprising that workplace 
norms reflect masculine behavioral norms rather than class 
behavioral norms. As sociologist Georg Simmel explained: 
“Man’s position of power does not only assure his relative 
superiority over the woman, but it assures that his standards 
become generalized as generically human standards that are to 
govern the behavior of men and women alike. . . .”196 Men have 
had a monopoly on the public world of work for much of our 
history (except for certain traditional “pink-collar” fields such 
as nursing, primary school teaching, and domestic help, all of 
which parallel traditional female duties in the home), and thus 
norms in the workplace have been derived from masculine 
expectations and male entitlement.197 When women entered the 
working world, they entered a pre-determined culture governed 
by male standards that had evolved into commonplace 
standards, which nevertheless remained gender-biased.  
Sex harassment came to be considered a form of sex 
discrimination because courts eventually recognized that 
women workers were being treated differently on the basis of 
sex and were disadvantaged on the job as a result.198 The 
problem of sex harassment was first recognized three decades 
ago as male superiors were using their job positions and 
economic power to intimidate women.199 Male employers sought 
to remind female employees that they could not stay in the 
workplace unless they fulfilled their gender-expected role of 
being compliant and sexually accessible.200 If the female 
employee did not submit to her supervisor’s sexual demands, 
then her employment status would suffer.201  
Sex harassment emerged under the umbrella of Title 
VII violations because such gender stereotyping and abuse 
were finally understood to undermine women’s equal treatment 
in the workplace.202 Legal feminist pioneer Catharine 
  
 196 GEORG SIMMEL, PHILOSOPHISCHE KULTUR (1911), quoted in MACKINNON, 
supra note 5, at 3. 
 197 See Abrams, supra note 192, at 1205-06. 
 198 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986) (recognizing sex 
harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII); MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 143-
213 (arguing for an interpretation of sex harassment as a legal injury based on sex).  
 199 MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 2. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id.  
 202 Id. at 57-82 (describing the history of early sex harassment cases). 
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MacKinnon argued in the 1970s that women’s economic 
subordination is linked to their sexual subordination, and that 
the prevailing structure of gender relations made the sexual 
domination of women a normative and pervasive occurrence.203 
She asserted that sex harassment is a distinct injury that 
afflicts many female employees because the sexual subjugation 
of women in society recreates itself in the work setting. In 
other words, women are vulnerable to sexual abuse because of 
their inferior economic status in the workplace and in society.204 
MacKinnon also identified two forms of sex harassment, quid 
pro quo and condition-of-work (now known as hostile work 
environment), 205 both of which were recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Meritor.206 
Uncovering the way in which sex harassment is 
perpetrated, MacKinnon denounced the once-believed view that 
sexual misbehavior is a private, individually-focused, and 
natural matter, arguing instead that sex harassment is a 
socially constructed public problem.207  By showing that sex 
harassment is a pervasive injury inflicted predominately upon 
women, who traditionally have less economic power, 
MacKinnon maintained that it should have a public remedy 
and be proscribed under federal anti-discrimination law.208 
Workplace sex harassment is sex discrimination because it 
prevents women from claiming equal power in the labor market 
on the basis of their sex.209 According to MacKinnon, men’s 
work-related control over women necessarily involves men’s 
sexual control over women, since women’s unequal capital 
status is interconnected with the social reality of unequal 
sexual relations between men and women and the harmful 
sexualization of women.210  
MacKinnon’s socio-cultural explanation helped facilitate 
a broad-based perspective on the problem of sex harassment by 
addressing how the problem can be manifested in the form of a 
discrete quid pro quo or diffuse hostile environment. Her work 
aided in rendering workplace sex harassment a cause of action 
  
 203 Id. at 220. 
 204 See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 216-18. 
 205 Id. at 32-47. 
 206 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
 207 MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 220.  
 208 Id. at 208. 
 209 Id. at 174-78. 
 210 Id. at 174. 
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under Title VII, and helped spark a nationwide consciousness 
that had remained dormant for too long.211  
Another legal feminist scholar, Vicki Schultz, asserts 
that sex harassment is mostly perpetrated to undermine or 
insult women’s control over their work.212 She challenges what 
she calls the sexual desire-dominance paradigm, the prevailing 
belief that sex harassment must be of a sexual nature to be 
actionable under Title VII.213 Instead, she contends that sex 
harassment follows a competence-centered model in that it 
primarily serves to discredit women’s competence and place in 
the male-dominated sphere of work.214 In contrast to 
MacKinnon, Schultz argues that sex harassment is not a mere 
reflection of gender inequality produced elsewhere in society, 
but actually serves to depict women specifically as incapable 
workers. Sex harassment thus guarantees men’s superior 
foothold in the workplace by granting them access to better 
jobs, positions, and sources of power.215 Hence, Schultz posits 
that sex harassment laws should be enforced according to 
whether the harassment is gender-based, and not whether the 
harassment is simply sexually driven or perpetrated.216 
Harassment stemming from sexual desire or consisting of 
sexual advances presumably would still be illegal under 
Schultz’s definition, but would not constitute the only valid 
kind of sex harassment. According to Schultz’s competence-
based paradigm, male employers and coworkers in traditionally 
male jobs want to preserve these occupations as male realms, 
and thus harass female entrants in order to undermine their 
efforts to succeed on the job.217 
In a follow-up piece, Schultz argues that sex 
harassment is primarily linked to sex segregation in 
employment, where men exclusively or predominately occupy 
positions of authority and engage in sex harassment to 
maintain female employees’ subordinate and outsider status.218 
Under this argument, the fact that men dominate the 
  
 211 See Cass Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 
829 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)). 
 212 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 
(1998). 
 213 Id. at 1689. 
 214 Id. at 1755. 
 215 Id. at 1690-91. 
 216 Id. at 1795-96. 
 217 Schultz, supra note 212, at 1690-91. 
 218 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2171-72 
(2003).  
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organizational hierarchy is what renders sexual behavior 
within the organization dangerous.219 Accordingly, Schultz 
urgently calls for full gender integration in the workplace, 
where women are equals and are represented at all levels of 
the organization to ensure that they actually have a role in 
shaping workplace dynamics.220 
Despite their differences, both MacKinnon and Schultz 
assert that sex harassment is based on sex and that masculine 
coercion and entitlement dominate the workplace and the 
gender relations within it. In this way, both scholars critique 
the structural inequality of power between the sexes. Yet a 
more complete picture finds that structural and socio-cultural 
forces have operated in tandem to keep women marginalized at 
work. The problem of sex harassment stems from hostile male 
reactions to women as they enter and remain in the work 
environment, regardless of whether the environment is blue- or 
white-collar. Hence, cultural patterns of gender rather than 
class govern the workplace.  
Separating sex harassment claims into blue- and white-
collar contexts only advances irrelevant and detrimental class 
distinctions that neglect the gender-based underpinnings of sex 
harassment. The debate over the norms of blue- and white-
collar culture distracts attention from the main issue 
underlying sex harassment. In recognizing that vulgar actions 
permeate both the shop-floor and the office, one must keep in 
mind the actual role of workplace culture in facilitating sex 
harassment. The imagined distinction between white- and 
blue-collar environments needs to be discarded so that the 
discussion can be correctly refocused on traditional masculine 
workplace norms and its injurious effect on female workers.  
Courts have learned not to disaggregate incidents of 
harassment but to look at the totality of the circumstances 
because they understand that harassment rarely consists of 
one discrete incident; rather, harassment is temporal and has a 
cumulative effect. Courts also should not disaggregate 
workplaces by class, because sex harassment in the workplace 
reflects the sexism that is rooted in our larger cultural 
traditions of gender interaction. Women have broken the 
silence surrounding sex harassment by bringing cases and 
sharing the devastating effect that harassment has had on 
  
 219 Id. at 2171-72. 
 220 Id. at 2174. 
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their aspirations and sense of self. Like men, women seek 
meaningful work to engage in productive activity and to gain a 
sense of order over their lives, economic and otherwise, but sex 
harassment in the workplace destroys their rightful and legal 
expectations to equal opportunity.  
B.  Question of Essentialism 
Some critics may argue that focusing on the gendered 
foundation of sex harassment promotes a uniform or “essential” 
description of women’s experience in the workplace that 
ignores other interacting facets of a woman’s identity, such as 
race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation.221 However, the 
aim here is certainly not to neglect or discount the relevance of 
these various influential factors in women’s daily lives.222 This 
work attempts to show only that class differentiation should 
not be invoked to give less protection to blue-collar women 
against sex harassment because both blue-collar and white-
collar women are harmed by it. Admittedly, blue-collar women 
may at times experience more explicit sex harassment than 
white-collar women, as depicted by scholars who have 
conducted in-depth field research into the working lives of blue-
collar women.223 But class at most only exacerbates sex 
harassment—class neither mitigates nor explains sex 
harassment. The source of sex harassment, whether in blue- or 
white-collar settings, is found not in class culture but in 
customary male behavioral norms operating in conjunction 
with male hostility against women in their places of work.  
  
 221 See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166-67 (1989) (asserting that feminist 
theory needs to incorporate a racial analysis to attract non-white women to the 
movement); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581, 586-90 (1990) (arguing that leading feminist legal theorists, while 
sympathetic to the plight of all women, tend to speak in one voice that represents 
women’s experience from a white, heterosexual, and privileged standpoint, and 
obscures the experience of diverse women who do not fit into this prevailing norm).  
 222 See discussion supra Part V.C.  
 223 See, e.g., CAROL CHETKOVICH, REAL HEAT: GENDER AND RACE IN THE 
URBAN FIRE SERVICE (1997) (interviewing female firefighters in the Oakland Fire 
Department); Elvia R. Arriola, “What’s the Big Deal?” Women in the New York City 
Construction Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 21, 51-63, app. at 70 (1990) (incorporating personal and telephone interviews of 
women construction workers into her research).  
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C.  Progress (to be made) in the Workplace 
The presence of a critical mass of women in white-collar 
fields has altered to some extent, although by no means 
eliminated, the normative practices (if not attitudes) of white-
collar men more so than in the blue-collar trades, where women 
still only constitute a bare minority.224 The unfortunate reality 
is that the specific interests of blue-collar women have been 
marginalized by the mostly middle- and upper-class feminist 
movement.225 The primary beneficiaries of the feminist 
movement have been middle-class women who made progress 
by entering the ranks of male-dominated white-collar jobs.226 As 
the women’s movement sought to elevate women’s status in 
society by bringing them into the most prestigious occupations, 
the movement neglected to make a similar push to bring 
working-class women into traditionally male blue-collar jobs.227 
Consequently, women’s representation in highly-paid blue-
collar jobs has lagged and continues to lag far behind women’s 
representation in highly-paid white-collar jobs.228 For instance, 
the percentage of women in full-time executive, administrative, 
and managerial occupations was 34.2% in 1983 and increased 
to 47.5% in 2002.229 On the other hand, women are far less 
represented in higher paying blue-collar jobs, such as 
protective service (17.7% women in 2002, up from 9.5% in 1983) 
and precision production, craft, and repair (8.0% women in 
2002, up from 7.9% in 1983).230 Within the protective service 
occupations, women represented only 3.6% of firefighters and 
12.4% of police and sheriff’s patrol officers in 2003.231 Likewise, 
women represented only 2.8% of the construction trades in 
2003.232 Further, women made up 7.9% of the labor force in the 
  
 224 Arriola, supra note 222, at 46-48.  
 225 See id. at 46. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See id. at 46-47. 
 228 See id. at 47. 
 229 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Rep. 972, Highlights of 
Women’s Earnings in 2002, at 10 (2003) [hereinafter Highlights of Women’s Earnings 
in 2002]. The first year for which comparable data is available is 1983.  
 230 Id.  
 231 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Household Data Annual 
Averages: Employed Persons by Detailed Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or 
Latino Ethnicity 211 (2003) [hereinafter Household Data Annual Averages 2003], 
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transportation and material moving occupations in 2002, 
slightly up from 4.7% in 1983.233  
As the numbers show, progress has been slow. Rather 
than gain significant entry into the better paying blue-collar 
workforce, unskilled women have remained mostly represented 
in the service occupation of private household work (92.5% 
women in 2002 and 96.0% in 1983).234 The traditionally pink-
collar fields have remained female-dominated: in 2003 women 
made up 96.6% of secretaries, 97.8% of preschool and 
kindergarten teachers, and 92.1% of registered nurses.235 The 
pay differentials among the various blue-collar occupations in 
2002 were substantial: women who worked in private 
household service occupations had median weekly earnings of 
$276 while women in transportation and material moving jobs 
made $449 per week; women in precision production made 
$479 per week and women in protective service made $501 per 
week.236 Within the blue-collar sector in 2000, the highest 
paying occupations included protective service, precision 
production, and transportation work, all of which have very few 
women in their ranks.237  
Despite the strides that women have made in white-
collar fields, the best paying and highly coveted blue-collar 
sectors have yet to embrace women into its labor force. The 
blue-collar division is still highly sex-segregated, indicating 
that something about these workplaces is keeping women out. 
This is even more problematic if one considers that women 
make up a greater proportion of the working poor,238 including 
poor one-parent families,239 and may be faced with the unsavory 
“choice” of entering a predominately male and most likely 
hostile blue-collar occupation for higher pay, or entering a 
predominately female but lower-paying blue-collar job. 
Given that women have not yet entered many of the 
most arduous blue-collar trades in sufficient numbers to make 
them their own, men in these trades may exhibit extreme 
  
 233 Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2002, supra note 229, at 10. 
 234 See id.  
 235 See Household Data Annual Averages 2003, supra note 231, at 210, 212. 
 236 Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2002, supra note 229, at 10. 
 237 See John E. Buckley, Rankings of full-time occupations, by earnings, 2000, 
125 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 46 (2002). 
 238 See Abraham Mosisa, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Rep. 
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hostility in an attempt to stave off full sex integration and 
preserve what they perceive to be the remaining “untainted” 
preserves of male work culture.240 Part of what makes the most 
segregated of the blue-collar fields so traditionally masculine 
appears to be the significant physical strength and stamina 
required, and the tool- or equipment-based nature of the 
work.241 Hence, if men in these jobs derive their sense of 
manhood from the manual and physically demanding aspects 
of the job, then their masculine identity might be threatened by 
seeing a woman doing the same work. Modern working-class 
men may also feel a lack of job security in this increasingly 
technological and globalized age, and thus perhaps more 
urgently seek to maintain their tenuous grasp on labor-
intensive occupations.  
Blue-collar women may have a harder time confronting 
problems of sex harassment due to the greater physical risks 
present in their work settings and the importance of coworker 
assistance in dangerous jobs. Their class occupation should not 
further be used against them in their demand for working 
conditions free of abuse. Hostile environment harassment is 
just as, if not more, serious and prevalent a problem for blue-
collar women as it is for white-collar women. Consequently, 
blue-collar women should not be forced to endure a more severe 
degree of harassment before they can successfully hold their 
harassers legally accountable. Moreover, subscribing to such 
strict class differences suggests a kind of “class essentialism” 
that ignores the significant relevance of gender in sex 
harassment. 
D.  Assumption of Risk Defense 
Some observers maintain that women who apply for 
blue-collar positions are aware of the coarse environments of 
these jobs and hence assume the risk of being surrounded by 
this kind of conduct when they enter the job.242  But contrary to 
  
 240 In addition to workplaces, hostile male opposition to women’s entry exists 
in other all-male or nearly all-male environments. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 43, at 
117-21 (1999) (describing the severe animosity unleashed toward the Citadel’s new 
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 241 Id. at 85-86 (describing how traditional manhood involved man’s utility 
with his hands). 
 242 See, e.g., Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be An Assumption of 
Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107 (1995) 
(exploring potential assumption of risk arguments in hostile environment suits). 
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this claim, the problem in fact is that a woman’s “consent” has 
been repeatedly invoked to justify her oppression, as Robin 
West has observed: “[T]he conditions which create [women’s] 
misery—unwanted pregnancies, violent and abusive marriages, 
sexual harassment on the job—are often traceable to acts of 
consent. Women—somewhat uniquely—consent to their 
misery.”243    
This assumption of risk argument is linked to the notion 
of consent, which the Supreme Court termed as “voluntariness” 
in Meritor: “The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is 
that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’ The correct 
inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that 
the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.”244 Susan Estrich 
makes an analogy between the voluntariness standard for sex 
harassment victims and the consent standard for rape victims 
in that both require that the victim demonstrate 
unwelcomeness.245 To determine if the woman has expressed 
that the offensive action was indeed unwelcome, Estrich notes 
that courts are instructed by Meritor’s holding to look to the 
woman’s conduct, implying that simple words of opposition 
may not be sufficient.246 Certainly, a woman’s verbal resistance 
to a man’s sexual pursuits has not been taken seriously in our 
culture because the woman is expected to say no rather than 
easily give in to his attention, an unfortunate legacy of our 
Western courtship tradition.247 Yet on the other hand, as 
Estrich cautions, a woman cannot act too stereotypically 
“feminine” because she may then be seen to have welcomed the 
sexual overtures.248 Applying this argument to a date-rape 
situation might complicate matters even further since the 
victim agreed to go on the date. But a date is not synonymous 
with sex, and her presence on the date should not be construed 
as her consent to anything that might happen on the date.  
Likewise in the case of sex harassment, the assumption 
of risk argument presumes that a woman’s presence in the 
  
 243 West, supra note 173, at 161. 
 244 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 245 Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 813-816 (1991).  
 246 Id. at 825-26 (asserting that looking at the harassment victim’s conduct 
can include focusing on how she dresses and talks to see if she acts in a provocative 
manner). 
 247 See Lee, supra note 11, at 394-95 (arguing that stalking activity 
predominately stems from our Western mores of romance and courtship, in which the 
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blue-collar work environment signals her “consent” to the 
coarse practices of that environment. The female employee was 
fully aware of the behavioral norms of the particular work 
setting, the argument goes, and thus she must have been 
willing to tolerate the conduct. Once a woman enters the blue-
collar working world, she is on her own and can only blame 
herself for choosing the wrong job if she ends up feeling 
harassed.  
How exactly should a woman act once she joins her male 
counterparts in her blue-collar occupation? She might not want 
to engage in vulgar banter with her coworkers but may feel 
compelled to do so in an attempt to be seen as part of the group 
and fit in. In Carr v. Gas Turbine Div.,249 for instance, the 
plaintiff was the first female to work in the tinsmith shop and 
in her testimony admitted that she joined her all-male 
coworkers in crude dialogue because she wanted to be accepted 
as “one of the boys.”250 The district court rejected Carr’s hostile 
environment harassment claim, holding that since Carr herself 
had used vulgarities, she “invited” the harassing conduct.251 
Realizing the incongruity of this ruling, Chief Judge Richard 
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Carr’s appeal, 
quickly dismissed the trial court’s conclusion, stating that 
“‘[w]elcome sexual harassment’ is an oxymoron.”252 Unlike the 
district court judge, Judge Posner exhibited more empathy in 
his opinion as he attempted to understand the events that took 
place in the tinsmith shop from Carr’s lone standpoint, stating 
that “her [vulgar] words and conduct cannot be compared to 
those of the men and used to justify their conduct . . . . The 
asymmetry of positions must be considered. She was one 
woman; they were many men.”253 In highlighting the unequal 
power dynamic between Carr and her coworkers, Judge Posner 
implicitly recognized the gendered norms of the male-
dominated workplace where the harassment had nothing to do 
with Carr’s behavior and everything to do with her being a 
woman who dared enter their shop. 
Fitting in and being accepted by the group may be even 
more important in particularly dangerous fields such as 
  
 249 Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 250 Id. at 1009-11. 
 251 Id. at 1010. 
 252 Id. at 1008. 
 253 Id. at 1011. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 127, at 104-11 (pointing out Judge 
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firefighting, where mutual cooperation is key and where one 
must be able to rely on one’s coworkers.254 But trying to fit in 
should not require a woman to endure abusive working 
conditions that are passed off as blue-collar norms. 
Furthermore, a woman who attempts to work in an 
intimidating environment should not be viewed as welcoming 
the hostile behavior, thus preventing her from later asserting a 
legitimate hostile environment harassment claim. On the other 
hand, even a tradeswoman who tries to avoid or repel the 
group’s practices may continue to be harassed. As Judge 
Posner noted, a female welder at Carr’s workplace who 
declined to take part in the crude behavior admitted that she 
still had to fend off her domineering male coworkers with her 
welding arc.255 She likely would still be targeted for harassment 
because she would be viewed as “oversensitive” or not a group 
player—someone not cut out for the trades.  
In either scenario, a blue-collar woman can find herself 
being subjected to a hostile environment because she reacts to 
her environment in either a stereotypically masculine or 
feminine manner. She finds herself in a catch-22 situation 
regarding how to behave on the job. Courts would look more 
favorably upon a plaintiff who avoided the vulgar behavior 
altogether because her non-involvement avoids complicating 
the unwelcomeness question, although courts have 
nevertheless found that a plaintiff can be straight-laced or 
oversensitive to her supervisor’s sexual comments.256 The 
defense that the blue-collar plaintiff herself took part in the 
uncouth behavior ignores the unequal relations between men 
and women.257 Given our historical and social understanding of 
gender relations and sexual violence, a man would feel less 
threatened by a woman’s suggestive or harassing actions than 
vice versa. As one scholar put it, “[a] woman firefighter might 
be able to put up a photograph of a naked man, but she cannot 
reproduce the social context that conveys to pornography the 
power to intimidate.”258  
Even for women who enter the trades because they are 
attracted to this type of work, it is the work and not the 
disrespectful environment accompanying it that draws them to 
  
 254 See CHETKOVICH, supra note 223. 
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the jobs. 259 Women who want to work in construction or 
firefighting should not have to contend with offensive and 
harmful comments on the job. If commonly-shared class norms 
were truly driving the work culture, then women in blue-collar 
jobs who belong to the same class (at least in terms of industry 
position) as their male counterparts presumably would find the 
work environment comfortable and appropriate, rather than 
abusive and hostile. However, blue-collar women make more 
than the occasional claim of hostile environment harassment 
with respect to their blue-collar jobs,260 implying that male 
domination, and not class difference, has significantly shaped 
the work environment. 
Blue-collar employees may engage in crude banter as a 
form of workplace humor to break the monotony of work on the 
shopfloor or to downplay the dangers or stresses involved in 
risky blue-collar work.261 Cultural studies indicate that teasing 
and practical joking can promote group cohesion in a job where 
teamwork is crucial to successful job performance.262 In 
addition, these studies suggest that humor can help diffuse 
simmering hostility by allowing it to be channeled through a 
sort of “‘safety-valve,’” in this way helping to maintain social 
order at work.263  
Nonetheless, men should not be allowed to “let off 
steam” at work by engaging in coarse dialogue and actions that 
women find abusive. Such a perspective would condone 
behavior that sounds disturbingly similar to the verbal and 
emotional abuse that occur in cases of domestic violence.264 
Women, whether at work or at home, must not be expected to 
tolerate the aggressive and abusive behavioral tendencies of 
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for Women in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45 
(1989). 
 260 Juliano & Schwab, supra note 87, at 560-61, 565 (observing that the 
majority of harassment plaintiffs were female and blue-collar or clerical, and the 
majority of sex harassment cases involved hostile environment claims). 
 261 See CHETKOVICH, supra note 223, at 33-35; DAVID COLLINSON, MANAGING 
THE SHOPFLOOR: SUBJECTIVITY, MASCULINITY, AND WORKPLACE CULTURE 105 (1992). 
 262 CHETKOVICH, supra note 223, at 33-35 (discussing how firefighters use 
teasing, joking, and storytelling to entertain, release tension, and deal with the 
demands of a hazardous job). 
 263 COLLINSON, supra note 261, at 105-06. 
 264 See Diane L. Rosenfeld, Why Doesn’t He Leave?: Restoring Liberty and 
Equality to Battered Women, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 535, 536-37 
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (discussing “the penumbral area 
of abuse [including domestic violence and sex harassment] that is legally prohibited 
but widely understood to be unpoliced”). 
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their partners or coworkers simply because men need to release 
stress. 
Notably, studies about the shopfloor also suggest that 
male humor may actually heighten, rather than mitigate, 
hostility between men and women in the blue-collar sector, 
confining women to the role of “outsiders” to the group 
masculine culture.265 This humor is used to trivialize the 
harmful animosity truly at issue, so that women are accused of 
“not getting the joke.”266 The fact remains that female 
employees in the blue-collar workforce do not necessarily share 
the masculine humor that dominates their workplaces,267 and 
may often find the “humorous” practices more intimidating and 
threatening than entertaining, thereby deriving no benefit 
from such an atmosphere and instead suffering injury.268 
Whether or not crude humor increases male productivity at 
work, male-oriented jokes or comments that objectify and 
malign women will likely cause female employees to become 
less productive. This result then fails to promote the general 
social order in the blue-collar workplace, and rather serves to 
promote the masculine social order of the workplace. Within 
this masculine realm, women then have to walk a fine line 
between being likable and being distant because women cannot 
engage in this type of teasing with men in the same manner 
that men can joke with one another.269 A woman who teases 
back can be perceived as someone who is “easygoing” or “can 
take it,” thus possibly opening herself up to more extreme 
behavior.270  
Workplace humor, however, can still flourish without 
causing workplace abuse if it incorporates the humor of 
women. If women are to feel comfortable and encouraged to 
enter highly masculine fields, they need some indication that 
the workplace has improved in terms of work behavior and 
culture. Many women who would otherwise enter male-
dominated trades decide not to do so because of the harassing 
  
 265 COLLINSON, supra note at 261, at 76-77. 
 266 See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 52 (“Trivialization of sexual harassment 
has been a major means through which its invisibility has been enforced. Humor, 
which may reflect unconscious hostility, has been a major form of that trivialization.”). 
 267 See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009-11 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
 268 See West, supra note 173, at 81 (“[A] man may experience as at worst 
offensive, and at best stimulating, that which a woman finds debilitating, 
dehumanizing or even life-threatening.”). 
 269 See CHETKOVICH, supra note 223, at 78-79. 
 270 Id. at 79. 
 2/28/2005 12:02:54 PM 
724 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
behavior that permeates these workplaces.271 But this fact 
should not suggest that women who do enter these fields 
consent to being harassed. Rather, they may take the jobs 
because they refuse to be deterred from doing the work they 
want to do or because they cannot afford not to take the jobs.272 
Poor women especially may seek to enter male-dominated 
trades such as construction and precision repair because these 
jobs offer higher economic rewards and good benefits.273 But 
they should not have to pay such a high price for their 
“choices.” Indeed, Title VII was enacted to enhance 
employment opportunities for women and to break down the 
long-existing barriers to economic entry and advancement.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Harassment is a murky phenomenon precisely because 
it is diffuse and fluid, infecting one’s surroundings like bad air. 
And like dirty air, harassment smothers those whom it 
touches, harming their ability to thrive in the place from where 
the harassment emanates. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in 
Rogers v. EEOC, a hostile environment case involving race 
discrimination, “[o]ne can readily envision working 
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to 
destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of 
minority group workers . . . .”274 Just as environmental law aims 
to curb pollution, anti-harassment law must strive to curb 
harassment. Title VII was intended to address the effects of 
harassment and sex discrimination by striking at the core of 
gender stereotypes and gender hostility. When considering 
hostile environment harassment claims, courts need to re-think 
workplace culture as not concerning job-specific culture, but 
involving masculine culture traditionally associated with the 
workplace. Only by recasting the discussion to focus on 
masculine norms within the workplace can we return to the 
  
 271 See D’Vera Cohn & Barbara Vobejda, For Women, Uneven Strides in 
Workplace; Census Data Reflect Decade of White-Collar Progress, Blue-Collar 
Resistance, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1992, at A1 (stating that women may refrain from 
becoming firefighters or construction workers because of “strong group cultures that 
can encourage hostility and harassment from men”). 
 272 See Law, supra note 259, at 48. 
 273 See id. 
 274 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). 
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original understanding and purpose of sex harassment law 
under Title VII: to help female workers achieve true equal 
employment opportunity. 
